Ethics, Philosophy

Musings on environmental ethics and our relationship to nature

Christian Gennari

Climate change is currently our most pressing existential issue. Leaving aside the sceptics on the matter, this paper seeks to discuss what it means for humans to live in an era of environmental turmoil, and its impact on how we should be acting. There are a plethora of perspectives on how to approach human behaviour in this context, the most relevant splits lie in the instrumental/non-instrumental value dichotomy, and the anthropocentric/biocentric views. Regarding instrumental and non-instrumental value, the discussion revolves around whether there is intrinsic value in nature in general. Is a tree valued for its intrinsic worth, i.e. for being a tree, or is it valued because of the utility it brings for humans? Many would agree that a person is intrinsically worthy of living, there is no need for an argument as to why we shouldn’t kill every human being, but can the same be said for nature? Adding to this, the anthropocentric versus biocentric debate concerns our

starting orientation when discussing nature, questioning whether human needs are more important than those of other living things. The latter view posits that the needs of human beings are not, thus “evening out the playing field”. Perspectives and problems To begin with, in this section I explore various perspectives on environmental ethics, highlighting the challenges and problems associated with our interaction with the natural world. I examine the concept of disenchantment and its impact on our perception of nature, discuss the proposal to grant legal standing to natural entities, delve into the deep ecology movement and its relational view of the world, and finally, present a very brief summary of Aldo Leopold's land ethic theory, which advocates for extending ethics to include the land and the entire biotic community. Through this exploration, I seek to provide a rich understanding of the human-nature dynamic, laying the groundwork for a more thoughtful and engaging discussion to follow. The dangers of disenchantment Before…

Philosophy

What constitutes wisdom? An enquiry on its pragmatic component

Christian Gennari

Might philosophers benefit from interacting with the sciences?

It seems necessary for a wise person to know the truth of things, why would she otherwise be wise? Wisdom comes with experience, and experience usually gives understanding to where it was lacking. Yet it’s not quite that simple. For while truth is a component of wisdom, it is not its entirety. Furthermore, one often finds that the truth found in wisdom is not of an absolute, objective or universal nature, but a pragmatic one. A different kind of truth? Wise truth is what I will be calling the component of truth found within wisdom henceforth. This wise truth is not concerned with finding ultimate answers, and instead manages to focus on the navigation of human experience. It is a type of truth that primarily acts as a beginning of venture for what the real purpose is. Let’s take a look at one of Laozi’s famous proverbs to exemplify. A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.

— Laozi Firstly, notice that it is factually true in an ordinary sense, any journey begins with a first step. Secondly, one instantly understands that this is not what is meant to be conveyed. If the reader sets aside the impulse to analytically dissect the proverb and rereads it the message clicks with more ease. This I take as an indication that wisdom is not preoccupied with crafting persuasive argumentation through logic as much as it is concerned with directly speaking to our hearts, to the emotional faculty. Reading that a journey starts with a first step doesn’t help us in any rational way to navigate our experiences better. Realising that every goal must be accompanied by a humble beginning does however help us change the way we emotionally react to this factual truth. Having established that wise truth is simply a springboard to the actual message, we can also see how this underlying wisdom is only truly understood by…

Philosophy

On wisdom: fluidity and illusiveness

Christian Gennari

Wisdom is not something easily defined. Might it be better understood without clearly defining its borders?

What comes to mind when I ask for what truth is? Most would respond “something which correctly depicts reality is true”. In other words, they point toward the Correspondence theory of truth. A statement is true if it matches or reflects the actual state of affairs, meaning that truth is simply a matter of how accurately beliefs correspond to reality. What if I ask the same question about knowledge? Here it already gets more complicated. Traditionally most thinkers have defined knowledge as Justified True Belief. There are three parts to what makes knowledge according to this answer: justification, truth and belief. To have knowledge about something a person must then be (1) justified in believing it, (2) the belief must be true and finally (3) the person has to hold that very belief of course. Having temporarily solved the issue of what truth and knowledge is, one might be inclined to think that the next question is another abstract concatenation

of these aforementioned concepts. But they would be wrong. What is wisdom? When one starts reading about the different proposed definitions of wisdom it quickly becomes clear that this is a completely different beast to tackle. Socrates that wisdom begins with recognizing one’s own ignorance. For him humility and openness to learning seems to have been key aspects. Notice how these are character traits, qualities of a person if you will. This definition of wisdom already challenges the notion that it is only a matter of what one believes, it also seems to revolve around how one acts. And surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what one does not know. It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that I differ from the majority of men, and if I were to claim that I am wiser than anyone in anything, it would be in this, that, as I have no adequate…