David Hume (1711-1776), widely considered one of the greatest philosophers in history, discusses the difference between direct, easily applicable moral philosophy1 and the more abstract, intellectually rigorous type in Section I of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Ultimately, his aim in this section seems to have been to (1) argue as to why both species of moral philosophy are needed, and to (2) explain how one should approach balancing practical engagement in life with rigorous intellectual inquiry.
Hume defends the value of abstruse philosophy and metaphysics, asserting that they deserve careful examination rather than dogmatic rejection. He emphasizes the importance of understanding the mind’s capabilities and limitations, a study he refers to as “mental geography.” By mapping out the distinct parts and powers of the mind, Hume believes we can ground philosophical inquiry in areas where human reason can effectively provide answers. Moreover, he stresses the need to balance intellectual pursuits with practical relevance, urging philosophers to remain connected to their humanity, warning against excessive abstraction and encouraging a philosophy that is human-centered and relevant to action and society.
The general preference of the easy and obvious
In the early paragraphs, Hume observes the distinction between what he calls the different species of moral philosophy: the “easy and obvious” and the “abstract and abstruse” philosophy. The former is characterized by its natural attraction, clarity and practicality, while the latter by its complexity, difficulty in understanding and often uselessness regarding direct practical applications (Hume 2007, p. 4).
This then leads him to another observation, that fame follows the easier and more obvious type in most cases.
It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful than the other (Hume 2007, p. 4).
It is worth noting that he makes a prediction which does not turn out to be true here. When speaking of the easier moral philosophy, he mentions how the writings of Cicero were flourishing during his time, while those of Aristotle had been brushed aside for the most part. He then proceeds by commenting that in the future, Joseph Addison2 might be regarded like Cicero, while John Locke may suffer a similar fate to that of Aristotle (Hume 2007, p. 4-5).
This did not turn out to be the case. John Locke is at present one of the biggest names in western philosophy, often being referred to as “the father of liberalism”. His work has shaped our modern western societies in the most fundamental of ways. This however, I posit to be a minor mistake in the grand scheme of things; his overall point still holds. One need only to look at the revival of Stoic philosophy in modern times, which most assuredly is a very easy and obvious type of philosophy, centring itself around clarity of mind through virtuous acting.
The common man and woman is most interested in what is of instrumental value; especially in our modern world. This means that such a person rarely searches for something because of its intrinsic allure, such as Truth or Knowledge, which is the “sacred” task of the abstruse, perfectionistic and rigorous intellectual. The common folk have not been indoctrinated into the philosophical principles, and so are concerned with their own survival and prospering more than any abstract notions. This search of instrumental value naturally turns toward clarity, easy and obvious understanding, while shunning away from the rest.
A need to inquire about the abstruse
Hume, like most others also finds himself more naturally attracted to the easier and obvious moral philosophy. Nonetheless, he ends up defending the abstruse and abstract type and more specifically the metaphysics that it generates for the rest of the section. He points out that this defence is necessary because the abstruse philosophy is often dismissed dogmatically and outright, merely for being abstruse, rather than being evaluated on its merits of being right or wrong. Just because one way is easier, does not mean that it is always the right one, both need to be fairly examined (Hume 2007, p. 6).
The first argument he poses is the scientific high standard of accuracy that the abstruse type promotes.
How painful soever this inward search or enquiry may appear, it becomes, in some measure, requisite to those, who would describe with success the obvious and outward appearances of life and manners. The anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and disagreeable objects; but his science is useful to the painter in delineating even a Venus or an Helen. While the latter employs all the richest colours of his art, and gives his figures the most graceful and engaging airs; he must still carry his attention to the inward structure of the human body, the position of the muscles, the fabric of the bones, and the use and figure of every part or organ. Accuracy is, in every case, advantageous to beauty, and just reasoning to delicate sentiment. In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other (Hume 2007, p. 6).
While the abstract and abstruse might seem “ugly” in the beginning, it brings about a scientific preciseness that is essential for moulding the easier and more appealing philosophy in later stages, he argues. And so, one is not without the other, at least not in the same capacity.
However, the greatest issue which I would have raised, and was happy to read that Hume discussed here, is that of the possibility that Truth is an illusion. If this is true, all metaphysical speculations would be futile from the start. Here he entertains the view that metaphysics may not be considered a true science, suggesting this is because it often stems either from the vain attempts of humans to understand matters that are entirely beyond the scope of human comprehension, or from popular superstitious beliefs that, unable to be rationally defended, hide behind complex and confusing metaphysical ideas in order to conceal and protect their weaknesses from scrutiny (Hume 2007, p. 7).
Having entertained this view, he then turns and takes a critical stance toward it, asking if this mere possibility is enough to warrant a complete halt in all metaphysical research? Furthermore, how are we to get rid of the corrupting superstition if we do not take the battle to the very grounds in which it lies? We need to thoroughly examine this area to be able to acknowledge and trust true metaphysical inquiry, he says (Hume 2007, p. 8).
Grounding philosophy in the study of mind
The only truth Hume is occupied with is the type of truth that can be discovered and verified through the application of rigorous, scientific reasoning and empirical investigation. This means that the only worthwhile inquiry is the one that examines human nature and its limits, ergo the mind. He writes:
And if we can go no farther than this mental geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to go so far; and the more obvious this science may appear (and it is by no means obvious) the more contemptible still must the ignorance of it be esteemed, in all pretenders to learning and philosophy (Hume 2007, p. 9).
Hume considers the study of “mental geography” — the mapping of the mind’s distinct parts and powers — to be the foundation for genuine knowledge, rather than engaging in metaphysical speculations. By carefully delineating the capabilities and limitations of human understanding, he believes we can eliminate the space for ungrounded metaphysical conjecture. Once we have a clear grasp of what the mind can and cannot do, philosophical inquiry can be constrained to areas where human reason can effectively provide answers.
This approach would indeed serve to eliminate the endless and often confusing metaphysical jargon and replace speculative philosophy with a more grounded and empirically informed investigation into the nature of human thought and understanding. In Hume’s view, this reorientation of philosophy around the study of the mind is the key to achieving genuine progress in our pursuit of knowledge.
The remaining pages are dedicated to motivating such an inquiry on human nature, and Hume concludes the section by expressing his hope that this will shed light on the most fundamental subjects, reconciling profound intellectual inquiry with clarity, and truth with novelty, potentially undermining the foundations of abstruse philosophy that has served as a shelter for superstition and error.
The ideal character
Finally, I have saved my favourite part of Section I for the end of my commentary. Before defending the inquiry to abstruse moral philosophy, Hume deals with the art of balancing intellectual inquiry with everyday life. He urges the reader to “Be a philosopher; but amidst all your philosophy, be still a man” (Hume 2007, p. 6).
It seems, then, that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to human race, and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biasses to draw too much, so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments. Indulge your passion for science, says she, but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and society. Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception which your pretended discoveries shall meet with, when communicated (Hume 2007, p. 5-6).
The reason being that humans are not solely naturally reasonable, but also social and active beings. Hence, the ideal person balances these aspects of life to achieve her most suitable type of living. Moreover, he stresses that since this is the case, philosophy must also be human-centered and relevant to action and society, avoiding excessive abstraction. He explicitly warns against the melancholy and uncertainty introduced by abstruse thought and profound research.
Hume, D. (2007) An enquiry concerning human understanding. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press (Oxford world’s classics).
- Keep in mind that in the 18th century, “moral philosophy” encompassed a broad study of human conduct, character, and moral judgments, often integrating theological and metaphysical considerations. This contrasts with the modern sense of “ethics”, which is more specialized, secular, and analytical, focusing on normative and metaethical inquiries.
- Joseph Addison (1672-1719) was an English essayist, poet, playwright, and politician. He is best known for his collaboration with Richard Steele on The Spectator, a daily publication that was highly influential in shaping English literary taste and manners in the early 18th century. Addison’s writing style was known for its clarity, wit, and elegance, which likely contributed to Hume’s prediction of his enduring popularity.