Commentary & Readings, Epistemology, Philosophy

David Hume on the issues of inductive reasoning and causality

Christian Gennari

In section IV of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, David Hume tackles the issues of inductive reasoning and causality. He scrutinizes the basis of our knowledge about the world, questioning whether our inferences about cause and effect are truly grounded in reason. Through this examination, Hume argues that our conclusions are not the result of logical necessity but rather stem from patterns of experience.

In this section, David Hume reveals his scepticism regarding causality and the basis of our conclusions about the world, ultimately questioning the rational foundations of inductive reasoning. I bring forth the key points of Hume's argument, tracing his analysis of cause and effect, the role of experience in our understanding, and his radical conclusion that our knowledge of the external world rests not on reason but on reoccurring patterns of experience. Hume’s Fork: Relations of ideas and matters of fact The first paragraphs introduce an important distinction between what Hume describes as the two objects of human reason: Relations of ideas and matters of fact. This distinction has later been nicknamed Hume’s Fork. What he means with reasoning through relations of ideas is analytical and abstract reasoning, where the answer is found without needing to call upon experience. This type of reasoning is characterized by intuitive thinking (e.g. all bachelors are unmarried) and demonstrative thinking (e.g. the Pythagorean theorem). Relations

of ideas may in more modern terms be translated as analytic a priori knowledge. All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. […] Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is any where existent in the universe (Hume 2007, p. 18). Matters of fact on the other hand are characterized by inferential reasoning — also called probable reasoning by John Locke, or moral reasoning by Hume — which is always dependent upon experience in order to be justified. Examples of this may be that “water is wet”. There is no way of knowing that water is wet without consulting experience first. Hence, this may instead be translated into synthetic a posteriori…

Commentary & Readings, Philosophy

David Hume on the nature of ideas

Christian Gennari

In section II & III of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding Hume introduces the key concepts that make up his Theory of Ideas. This, in its essence, is a deeper dive into the capabilities and limits of the mind.

David Hume's inquiry into the origin of ideas is a foundational aspect of his philosophical work, aiming to clarify the nature of human perception and understanding. In section II of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding this exploration begins with a crucial distinction between two modes of the mind: impressions and ideas. After this distinction is made, Hume's analysis delves into the faculty of imagination, highlighting its limitations despite its apparent boundlessness. He argues that imagination is confined to manipulating the materials provided by the senses and experience. This leads to the formulation of Hume's Copy Principle, which posits that all ideas are copies of impressions. Finally, through a series of arguments and examples, he demonstrates how complex ideas can be traced back to simple impressions and how the absence of certain sensory experiences limits the formation of corresponding ideas. Impressions and ideas The first thing Hume does is to notice the difference between what is being perceived by the mind

and what is being thought by the mind. These, he posits, are two different modes of the mind. It is indeed clear to most that when someone is angry, it is a very different sensation from the one present when merely reflecting on the idea of anger. The former state is more vivacious, has more force. The same goes for being in love compared to understanding that a friend is in love with someone. Hume does mention that there few cases where the contrary is true, when the idea of something might outshine the actual state. But the people experiencing such scenarios are always suffering from mental disorders or madness in some capacity. The absolute majority perceive the state of being in love as an experience of greater force compared to when thinking of love. To keep track of these two modes of perception, he proposes that we name and categorize them as impressions and ideas. Impressions being the more…

Commentary & Readings, Philosophy

David Hume on the species of philosophy, study of mind and the ideal character

Christian Gennari

In this commentary of Section I of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, I explore Hume’s arguments for the necessity of metaphysical inquiry, the importance of grounding philosophy in the study of the mind, and the ideal character of a philosopher who balances intellectual and practical life. Hume’s insights offer a compelling perspective on the nature and purpose of philosophical inquiry.

David Hume (1711-1776), widely considered one of the greatest philosophers in history, discusses the difference between direct, easily applicable moral philosophy and the more abstract, intellectually rigorous type in Section I of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Ultimately, his aim in this section seems to have been to (1) argue as to why both species of moral philosophy are needed, and to (2) explain how one should approach balancing practical engagement in life with rigorous intellectual inquiry. Hume defends the value of abstruse philosophy and metaphysics, asserting that they deserve careful examination rather than dogmatic rejection. He emphasizes the importance of understanding the mind's capabilities and limitations, a study he refers to as "mental geography." By mapping out the distinct parts and powers of the mind, Hume believes we can ground philosophical inquiry in areas where human reason can effectively provide answers. Moreover, he stresses the need to balance intellectual pursuits with practical relevance, urging philosophers to remain connected to their

humanity, warning against excessive abstraction and encouraging a philosophy that is human-centered and relevant to action and society. The general preference of the easy and obvious In the early paragraphs, Hume observes the distinction between what he calls the different species of moral philosophy: the “easy and obvious” and the “abstract and abstruse” philosophy. The former is characterized by its natural attraction, clarity and practicality, while the latter by its complexity, difficulty in understanding and often uselessness regarding direct practical applications (Hume 2007, p. 4). This then leads him to another observation, that fame follows the easier and more obvious type in most cases. It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful than the other (Hume 2007, p. 4). It is worth noting that he makes a prediction which does…

Ethics, Philosophy

Musings on environmental ethics and our relationship to nature

Christian Gennari

Climate change is currently our most pressing existential issue. Leaving aside the sceptics on the matter, this paper seeks to discuss what it means for humans to live in an era of environmental turmoil, and its impact on how we should be acting. There are a plethora of perspectives on how to approach human behaviour in this context, the most relevant splits lie in the instrumental/non-instrumental value dichotomy, and the anthropocentric/biocentric views. Regarding instrumental and non-instrumental value, the discussion revolves around whether there is intrinsic value in nature in general. Is a tree valued for its intrinsic worth, i.e. for being a tree, or is it valued because of the utility it brings for humans? Many would agree that a person is intrinsically worthy of living, there is no need for an argument as to why we shouldn’t kill every human being, but can the same be said for nature? Adding to this, the anthropocentric versus biocentric debate concerns our

starting orientation when discussing nature, questioning whether human needs are more important than those of other living things. The latter view posits that the needs of human beings are not, thus “evening out the playing field”. Perspectives and problems To begin with, in this section I explore various perspectives on environmental ethics, highlighting the challenges and problems associated with our interaction with the natural world. I examine the concept of disenchantment and its impact on our perception of nature, discuss the proposal to grant legal standing to natural entities, delve into the deep ecology movement and its relational view of the world, and finally, present a very brief summary of Aldo Leopold's land ethic theory, which advocates for extending ethics to include the land and the entire biotic community. Through this exploration, I seek to provide a rich understanding of the human-nature dynamic, laying the groundwork for a more thoughtful and engaging discussion to follow. The dangers of disenchantment Before…

Philosophy

What constitutes wisdom? An enquiry on its pragmatic component

Christian Gennari

Might philosophers benefit from interacting with the sciences?

It seems necessary for a wise person to know the truth of things, why would she otherwise be wise? Wisdom comes with experience, and experience usually gives understanding to where it was lacking. Yet it’s not quite that simple. For while truth is a component of wisdom, it is not its entirety. Furthermore, one often finds that the truth found in wisdom is not of an absolute, objective or universal nature, but a pragmatic one. A different kind of truth? Wise truth is what I will be calling the component of truth found within wisdom henceforth. This wise truth is not concerned with finding ultimate answers, and instead manages to focus on the navigation of human experience. It is a type of truth that primarily acts as a beginning of venture for what the real purpose is. Let’s take a look at one of Laozi’s famous proverbs to exemplify. A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.

— Laozi Firstly, notice that it is factually true in an ordinary sense, any journey begins with a first step. Secondly, one instantly understands that this is not what is meant to be conveyed. If the reader sets aside the impulse to analytically dissect the proverb and rereads it the message clicks with more ease. This I take as an indication that wisdom is not preoccupied with crafting persuasive argumentation through logic as much as it is concerned with directly speaking to our hearts, to the emotional faculty. Reading that a journey starts with a first step doesn’t help us in any rational way to navigate our experiences better. Realising that every goal must be accompanied by a humble beginning does however help us change the way we emotionally react to this factual truth. Having established that wise truth is simply a springboard to the actual message, we can also see how this underlying wisdom is only truly understood by…

Philosophy

On wisdom: fluidity and illusiveness

Christian Gennari

Wisdom is not something easily defined. Might it be better understood without clearly defining its borders?

What comes to mind when I ask for what truth is? Most would respond “something which correctly depicts reality is true”. In other words, they point toward the Correspondence theory of truth. A statement is true if it matches or reflects the actual state of affairs, meaning that truth is simply a matter of how accurately beliefs correspond to reality. What if I ask the same question about knowledge? Here it already gets more complicated. Traditionally most thinkers have defined knowledge as Justified True Belief. There are three parts to what makes knowledge according to this answer: justification, truth and belief. To have knowledge about something a person must then be (1) justified in believing it, (2) the belief must be true and finally (3) the person has to hold that very belief of course. Having temporarily solved the issue of what truth and knowledge is, one might be inclined to think that the next question is another abstract concatenation

of these aforementioned concepts. But they would be wrong. What is wisdom? When one starts reading about the different proposed definitions of wisdom it quickly becomes clear that this is a completely different beast to tackle. Socrates that wisdom begins with recognizing one’s own ignorance. For him humility and openness to learning seems to have been key aspects. Notice how these are character traits, qualities of a person if you will. This definition of wisdom already challenges the notion that it is only a matter of what one believes, it also seems to revolve around how one acts. And surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what one does not know. It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that I differ from the majority of men, and if I were to claim that I am wiser than anyone in anything, it would be in this, that, as I have no adequate…

Epistemology, Philosophy

Reflektioner kring förståelser av kunskap

Christian Gennari

Vad är kunskap? Traditionellt sett har det definierats som sann berättigad tro, men moderna utmaningar i form av Gettier-fall ifrågasätter detta. Montaigne ser samtidigt kunskap som en kreativ process snarare än ren informationssamling. Finns det värde i denna formulering?

Platon eller biodlaren, vem vet mest?

Vad är kunskap? Detta är en fråga som jag brottats med de senaste månaderna i och med min kurs i kunskapsteori. Det traditionella sättet att definiera kunskap har länge varit i form av sann berättigad tro. Det kan illustreras med formell logik på följande vis. (P) är sant (S) tror att (P) är sant (S) har goda skäl för att tro (P) Om dessa tre kriterier uppfylls så menas det att kunskap är fastställd. Denna definition kan kopplas tillbaka till Platons dialog Theaitetos, det vill säga väldigt långt bakåt i historien. Trots att den dialogen avslutas utan att karaktärerna anser sig ha uppnått en tillfredsställande definition så har kunskap som sann berättigad tro följt med inom den epistemologiska debatten sedan dess. De flesta har ansett det vara ett robust nog sätt att förstå kunskap och därav inte haft anledning att fortsätta undersöka konceptet. Så sent som 1963 publicerades en artikel av Edmund Gettier (2008) som skulle komma att förstöra den

illusion av tydlighet som följt med sedan Platon. Gettier målar upp exempel på fall där samtliga kriterier uppfylls, men kunskap ändå inte verkar vara nådd. Dessa exempel har i efterhand kommit att kallas för Gettierfall och ett recept har tagits fram av Linda Zagzebski (2008) för att skapa de. Fastställ en rättfärdigad tro Se till att rättfärdigandet är starkt nog för att kvalificeras för vad normalt settanses vara kunskap Gör så att tron är falsk genom slumpen Gör att tron blir sann genom ett slumpmässigt inslag Detta leder till en rättfärdigad sann tro som inte är kunskap Ett av gettierfallen som Gettier själv lyfter i sin artikel handlar om vem som får ett jobb efter en jobbintervju. Anta att Smith och Jones båda söker samma jobb. Smith har starka skäl att tro att (1) Jones kommer att få jobbet och att (2) Jones har tio mynt i fickan. Smiths bevis för påståendena är det faktum att företagets VD försäkrade honom…

Philosophy

Det finns inget behov av att tro på din egen existens

Christian Gennari

Precis som när man har en livlig dröm utan att ifrågasätta dess verklighet, kan vi uppleva livet utan att bekräfta vår egen existens.

To be, or not to be, is that the question?

Min grundtanke är att man inte behöver ha en tro på sin egen existens eller på verkligheten i den yttre världen för att uppleva livet på ett meningsfullt sätt. I det här sammanhanget förstås erfarenhet som kulmen av att uppfatta, känna, agera och reflektera, vilket kan ske oberoende av ens filosofiska inställning till sin egen existens. Livets erfarenheter — allt från sinnesförnimmelser till känslomässiga reaktioner och interaktioner med det som uppfattas som den yttre miljön — kräver inte en medveten bekräftelse av den egna existensen. Dessa upplevelser är giltiga och betydelsefulla i sig själva, ungefär som man kan ha en livlig dröm utan att ifrågasätta dess verklighet under upplevelsen. Ta tv-spel som exempel. Jag vet att tv-spelet jag spelar inte…

Philosophy

Hur västerländskt tänkande skapar falska hotbilder

Christian Gennari

Västerländskt tänkande, med sitt fokus på stabilitet och fasta rutiner, skapar ofta falska hotbilder och en motvilja till förändring.Stabilitet ses som trygghet, medan österländska kulturer, särskilt Kina, visar en större acceptans för paradoxala idéer. Denna skillnad är värd att diskutera.

Västerländska fallgropar gentemot det österländska tänkandet.

Jag mot världen, det är med detta perspektiv som vi har lärt oss att navigera livet på ett realistiskt sätt. I sig självt behöver inte detta vara ett fientligt förhållningssätt, utan oftast kan vi känna att det till och med hjälper oss att förstå vad vi bör och inte bör göra, hur vi ska navigera vardagslivet för att främja vårt egna välmående, och — om vi vuxit upp med en något närvarande moralisk anda i hemmet — hur vi gör dessa ting utan addera skada till en redan lidande värld. Utöver att separera oss från resten av världen, så ser västerländska kulturer på stabilitet och fasthet som nyckeln till förståelse och lycka. Vare sig det är ett stabilt förhållande, en fast anställning eller starka hälsosamma rutiner som ska hjälpa oss att må bra. Vi associerar denna fasthet, stabilitet och hållbarhet med trygghet. Den västerländska tänkaren Immanuel Kant var en stor förespråkare av rutiner, han planerade sina dagar in i minsta

detalj och såg det som en av de största anledningarna till att han kunde skriva sina mästerverk. I sin bok Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View skriver han "att fylla vår tid med hjälp av metodiska, progressiva sysselsättningar som leder till ett viktigt och avsett mål… är det enda säkra sättet att bli lycklig med sitt liv och samtidigt mätt på livet". Det är tydligt att västerländskt tänkande resulterar i ett starkt behov av stadighet, av fast mark. Men precis som Byung-Chul Han (2023) så ser jag hur det gömmer sig en djupgående problematik i detta behov. Western thinking has its source in a desire for a solid ground. It is precisely this compulsive desire for permanence and clarity that makes every deviation, every transformation, look like a threat. — Byung-Chul Han För i och med att vi lyfter stabilitet, faller det naturligt för oss att avsky motsatsen, det vill säga förändring. I jämförelse med västerlandet så visar det…